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Abstract 
Is political fragmentation (i.e. nation states) more favorable to economic growth than political 
unification (i.e. a united empire)? This paper develops a simple endogenous-growth model to analyze the 
conditions under which economic growth is higher under political fragmentation than under political 
unification. Under political unification, the economy is vulnerable to excessive Leviathan taxation and 
possibly subject to the costs of unifying heterogeneous populations. Under political fragmentation, the 
competing rulers are constrained in taxation but spend excessively on military defense. If and only if 
capital is sufficiently mobile, then political fragmentation would favor economic growth. When the 
political regime is chosen by the rulers, they do not always choose the growth-maximizing regime. In 
particular, there exists a range of parameter values, in which political fragmentation is more favorable to 
growth but the rulers prefer political unification.  
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1. Introduction 
Is political fragmentation (i.e. nation states) more favorable to economic growth than political unification 
(i.e. a united empire)? A number of economic historians, such as North (1981) and Jones (1981), argue 
that the unique European nation-state system contributed to its economic takeoff in the late 18th and early 
19th century while the united-empire system in China was responsible for its economic stagnation during 
that period.1 For example, North (1981) suggests that the interstate competition arising from political 
fragmentation induces the competing rulers to recognize private property rights in order to prevent labor 
and capital outflows, and the resulting economic system with secured property rights creates the proper 
environment for capital accumulation and hence sustained growth. However, Bernolz and Vaubel (2004) 
note that political fragmentation did not always lead to these predicted effects.  
“Political fragmentation is not a sufficient condition for political competition, innovation 
and growth… Political fragmentation will not lead to interstate competition unless there 
is considerable mobility among jurisdictions… Political fragmentation will not favour 
innovation and growth if it leads to prolonged and highly destructive wars rather than 
limited warfare or peaceful competition for manpower and capital.”  
Bernolz and Vaubel (2004, p. 14) 
So, under what conditions would fragmentation be more favorable to growth than unification? Also, when 
the political regime is chosen by the rulers, do they have the incentives to choose the regime that is more 
favorable to growth?  
 To analyze the growth effects of fragmentation versus unification, this paper develops a simple 
endogenous-growth model characterized by three parameters indexing (a) the degree of capital mobility, 
(b) the extent of competition in military defense and (c) the heterogeneity costs or the benefits of 
unification under a unified country. We analyze how these three factors affect the households’ capital 
investment rate and the rulers’ tax rate, which in turn determine the equilibrium growth rate, under the 
two political regimes. We follow Karayalcin (2008) to use the tax rate to capture both legal and extra-
                                                 
1 See, for example, Bernholz et al (1998) and Bernholz and Vaubel (2004) for a comprehensive survey. 
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legal property expropriations by rulers. This formulation of using taxation as a measure of property rights 
is also consistent with Drazen’s (2000, p. 459) obersvation that “… property rights can be considered in 
the narrow sense as applying to taxation of property: even in the absence of the threat of outright 
expropriation, societies can nonetheless legally expropriate the fruits of accumulation via taxation.” 
Within this framework, we have the following findings. On one hand, political fragmentation can 
be advantageous to growth because the competition between rulers limits their ability in taxing 
households. The extent of this limitation is governed by the degree of capital mobility, which in turn is 
determined by a mobility cost. This mobility cost is meant to capture North’s (1981) idea that the 
monopoly power of a ruler depends on the cost of exit for the citizens. On the other hand, political 
fragmentation can be damaging to growth if the competing rulers allocate an excessive amount of 
productive resources to military defense. As for the case of political unification, the unified country may 
have (a) a higher level of aggregate productivity due to economies of scales and lower trade barrier or (b) 
lower productivity due to the costs of unifying heterogeneous populations into a single nation. We will 
consider both possibilities. Allowing for the possibility of these heterogeneity costs enables the model to 
capture some of the important insights from the country-formation literature. For example, Alesina and 
Spolaore (2003, 2005) argue that there are additional costs in ruling heterogeneous populations under a 
single nation. Potential sources of these costs include conflicting preferences over public policies, 
coordination costs, monitoring costs, and the expected losses associated with civil wars. 
 In summary, under political unification, the economy is vulnerable to excessive Leviathan 
taxation and subject to the heterogeneity costs or unification benefits. Under political fragmentation, the 
competing rulers are constrained in taxation but spend excessively on military defense. The theoretical 
analysis suggests that whether fragmentation or unification is more favorable to growth depends on the 
degree of capital mobility. If and only if the degree of capital mobility is higher (lower) than a critical 
threshold, then fragmentation (unification) would favor economic growth, and this critical threshold is 
increasing in the degree of defense competition and decreasing in the heterogeneity costs (or increasing in 
the unification benefits).   
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When the political regime is chosen by the rulers, they do not necessarily choose the growth-
maximizing regime. In particular, there exists a range of values for the heterogeneity costs (or the 
unification benefits), in which fragmentation is more favorable to growth but the rulers prefer unification. 
On one hand, when the heterogeneity costs are sufficiently high (or the unification benefits are 
sufficiently low), economic growth is higher under fragmentation that exhibits tax competition. On the 
other hand, the rulers suffer from consuming a lower level of tax revenue under fragmentation due to 
competition in both taxation and defense. When the heterogeneity costs are not excessively high (or the 
unification benefits are not excessively low), this negative level effect dominates the positive growth 
effect under fragmentation, and the rulers enjoy a higher level of utility under unification. In this case, 
although fragmentation favors growth, the rulers prefer unification. In contrast, the households always 
prefer the regime that favors growth. Therefore, there is a range of values for the heterogeneity costs (or 
the unification benefits) in which the households and the rulers have conflicting preferences, and this 
range of parameter values is expanding in the degree of (a) defense competition, (b) capital mobility and 
(c) Leviathan (i.e. the weight that the rulers place on taxation relative to households’ welfare). 
 
Related Literatures  
This paper relates to a number of literatures (a) institutional economics and economic history, (b) 
endogenous-growth theory, (c) Leviathan and tax competition, (d) country formation and (e) the political 
economy of growth. This paper formalizes some important insights from a number of economic historians 
on the effects of political fragmentation on growth using an AK endogenous-growth model. In particular, 
it embeds a framework of Leviathan taxation into the growth model to analyze the conditions under which 
capital mobility would constrain the tax rate chosen by self-interested rulers and enhance growth under 
fragmentation.2 Furthermore, it borrows some of the insights from the literature on country formation to 
analyze the different growth effects of fragmentation and unification. Alesina and Spolaore (2005) 
                                                 
2 The literature on Leviathan and tax competition was initiated by Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1980). See, for 
example, Edwards and Keen (1996) and Rauscher (1998) for a theoretical formulation. 
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analyze how the heterogeneity costs and the cost of international conflict affect the size and the number of 
nations.3 In contrast, the current paper firstly analyzes how these factors affect economic growth for a 
given size and number of nations. Then, it considers whether the political regime that is more favorable to 
growth would be chosen by the rulers. 
Drazen (2000, ch. 11), Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 14) and Acemoglu (2008, ch. 22 and 23) 
provide excellent surveys on the political economy of growth. Chaudhry and Garner (2006) model 
another effect of political competition in which the presence of rival states reduces the rulers’ incentives 
to block innovation and enhances growth. Chaudhry and Garner (2007) incorporate a rent-seeking 
government into a Schumpeterian model to analyze the conditions under which self-interested political 
elites would adopt growth-reducing policies. The current paper differs from these studies by analyzing 
different growth effects of political competition through capital mobility and military defense. 
Karayalcin (2008) also analyzes the growth effects of fragmentation versus unification. On one 
hand, the current paper is in line with this study by considering the effects of tax competition on capital-
accumulation-driven growth under different political regimes. On the other hand, it differs from this study 
by (a) also considering interstate competition in military defense and (b) allowing for the possibility of 
heterogeneity costs under unification. The consideration of defense competition leads to the possibility of 
a higher tax rate and hence a lower growth rate under fragmentation. The presence of heterogeneity costs 
leads to the possibility that the rulers may prefer fragmentation over unification.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model and results. 
The final section concludes with a brief discussion on the first unification of China in 221 BC.  
 
2. The Model 
There is a continuum of identical households residing in each of the two symmetric regions. In the case of 
political unification, the unified country is ruled by a group of political elites, who choose the tax rate and 
consume the tax revenue to maximize their utility that is a weighted average of the tax revenue and 
                                                 
3 See, also, Bolton and Roland (1997) and Alesina and Spolaore (2003). 
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households’ welfare. Taking the tax rate as given, the households choose consumption and investment to 
maximize their utility. Due to constant returns to scale in capital in the production function, the output 
growth rate is determined by the investment rate and the tax rate.  
 In the case of political fragmentation, each of the two regions is ruled by a group of political 
elites, who make an additional decision on defense spending for the purpose of capturing a larger share of 
land. The households also have to make an additional decision on the allocation of capital. When the 
households allocate a fraction of their capital to the other region, they face a mobility cost. This mobility 
cost determines capital mobility and affects the equilibrium tax rate chosen by the political elites. As the 
degree of capital mobility increases, the political elites reduce the tax rate due to tax competition. 
 
 Households 
There is a unit-continuum of identical households residing in each region ∈j {home, foreign}, and their 
lifetime utility is  
(1) ∫∞ − +=
0
)](ln)([ln)( . dtjLjCejU tt
t δρ ,4  
where )1,0(∈ρ  is the households’ discount rate . )( jCt  denotes consumption at time t, and )( jLt  
denotes the amount of land owned by region j.5 0>δ  is a preference parameter indicating the utility 
importance of land and determines the degree of competition in military defense under fragmentation. To 
simplify notation, I will suppress the regional index j for the home region and denote variables for the 
foreign region with a superscript prime. 
At each instant of time, the households use their accumulated capital tK  to produce goods, and 
they decide how much to consume and invest in capital by maximizing utility subject to a sequence of 
budget constraints given by 
                                                 
4 The log utility function together with an AK production function ensure that the policies chosen by the elites are 
time consistent as we will discuss below.  
5 This formulation of treating land as a direct component in the utility function is equivalent to treating land as a 
factor input for perishable agricultural products that are then consumed.   
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(2) ttttt MTCYK −−−=& .  
tY  is the amount of goods produced. Following the literature on AK growth, the production function is 
assumed to have constant returns to scale in capital such that ttt KAY = .6 To incorporate an interesting 
element from the country-formation literature into the model, aggregate productivity tA  is assumed to be 
a function of the heterogeneity costs or the unification benefits captured by a parameter 1<h . In 
particular, )1( hA tt γ−= , where tγ  is an 0-1 indicator that equals 1 for unification and equals 0 for 
fragmentation. When )1,0(∈h , it captures the costs of unifying heterogeneous populations into a single 
nation as in Alesina and Spolaore (2005). When 0<h , it captures the benefits of unification due to 
economies of scale and lower trade barrier between regions. 
tttttt KssT ])1([ ττ ′+−≡  is the amount of capital tax paid by the households,7 and ]1,0[∈ts  is 
defined as the share of capital allocated to the foreign region. tτ  ( tτ ′ ) is the tax rate in the home (foreign) 
region. As in Karayalcin (2008), this tax rate should not be viewed as the statutory tax rate; instead, it 
represents the degree of legal and extra-legal expropriation by the rulers. If the tax rates (i.e. the extent of 
expropriation by the rulers) differ across regions, then the households have the incentives to allocate some 
or even all of their capital to the other region. However, when they do so, they face a mobility cost. The 
last term in (2) represents a mobility cost in ts  incurred by the households if they allocate a share ts  of 
their capital to the other region. As in Persson and Tabellini (1992), we consider a convex mobility cost to 
capture varying degree of capital mobility. For analytical tractability, the convex mobility cost tM  is 
assumed to take the following functional form  
(3) )2/(2 mKsM ttt = .  
                                                 
6 Capital should be viewed as composite, including physical capital, human capital, and other types of capital.  
7 Due to constant returns to scale in the production function, a tax on capital is equivalent to a tax on capital income.  
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tM  is increasing and convex in ts , implying that it is costly for the households to carry out capital 
outflow and that the associated marginal cost is increasing in the size of capital outflow. We let tK  enter 
tM  linearly to ensure a balanced-growth path. The parameter ),0[ ∞∈m  indexes the degree of capital 
mobility across regions. When m  equals zero, the mobility cost goes to infinity and capital is de facto 
immobile. As m  approaches infinity, the mobility cost goes to zero and capital is perfectly mobile.  As 
we will show later, other things being equal, an increase in m  reduces the equilibrium tτ . Therefore, the 
parameter m can also be viewed as an index measuring the degree of tax competition. 
 
Political Elites 
There is a group of political elites in each region. Under political unification, the two groups of elites 
cooperate and rule the two regions as a unified country. Under political fragmentation, each group rules 
its region as an independent nation. The elites’ lifetime utility is  
(4) ∫∞ − +−++=
0
)]ln)(ln1()ln(ln[. dtLClLRleV tttt
t δδβ ,  
where )1,0(∈β  is the elites’ discount rate. tR  is the amount of tax revenue extracted and expended by 
the elites for their own consumption. The parameter )1,0(∈l  indexes the degree of Leviathan. As l  
approaches zero, the elites become completely benevolent. As l  approaches one, the elites become 
completely self-interested. This degree of Leviathan reflects the extent of the rulers’ accountability. The 
higher the accountability, the lower the l  should be. Similar political preferences have been utilized by 
Edwards and Keen (1996), Rauscher (1998) and Arzaghi and Henderson (2005). Also, (4) assumes that 
the elites have the same preference as the households on the amount of land captured by their nation.8 
 
 
                                                 
8 Relaxing this assumption only adds an extra parameter to the model without changing the results. 
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Political Unification 
In the case of unification, the groups of elites allocate the amount of land equally among the two regions, 
where the total amount of land is normalized to two such that 1=tL  in each region. The amount of goods 
produced in each region is tt KhY )1( −= . Because the unified country incurs zero defense spending, the 
amount of tax revenue consumed by each group of elites is ttt KR τ= . Denote tc  as the fraction of 
capital consumed by the households (i.e. ttt KcC = ). Taking the path of tτ  as given, the households 
choose the control path of tc  to maximize (1) subject to (2). Taking the households’ best response as 
given, the elites choose the control path of tτ  to maximize (4) subject to (2).9 It is well known that this 
Ramsey approach typically suffers from the so-called “time inconsistent” problem (i.e. after households 
make their best response, the elites have the incentives to deviate from their chosen policies ex post). 
Time inconsistency does not occur in our model given the pair of utility and production functions.10  
Since the two regions are identical, we seek a symmetric solution. The two groups of political 
elites coordinate their policies to enforce tt ττ ′=  for all t and hence households will choose 0=ts  for all 
t to avoid the incidence of mobility cost. The equilibrium under unification is denoted with a superscript u. 
  
Lemma 1: Under political unification, the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium is stationary and  
(5) ρ=utc ,  
(6) βτ lut = ,  
(7) )(1 βρτ lhcAg utututut ++−=−−= .  
Proof: See Appendix A.□  
                                                 
9 Technically, we are solving a Stackelberg differential game, in which the elities (the leader) choose the policy first 
and then households (followers) choose their control path. Appendix A shows that the equilibrium is time consistent 
and subgame perfect. See, for example, Dockner et al (2000), Xie (1997) and Karp and Lee (2003) for a discussion. 
10 Xie (1997) shows that time-consistent fiscal policies can be obtained in Stackelberg differential games for the 
class of utility-production pairs given by )1/()1( 1 σσ −−= −CU  and σAKY =  for ]1,0(∈σ . Our setup 
corresponds to the case of 1=σ . 
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tg  is the equilibrium growth rate of output, and the time subscript will be suppressed for convenience. 
Firstly, ug  is decreasing in ρ  because an increase in ρ  increases consumption and hence reduces 
capital investment. Secondly, ug  is decreasing in βl  because an increase in either l  or β  leads to a 
higher tax rate that reduces capital investment. Finally, ug  is decreasing in h  because a larger h  (i.e. 
larger heterogeneity costs or smaller unification benefits) reduces aggregate productivity.  
 
Political Fragmentation 
Under political fragmentation, total output in each region is tt KY =  because 0=h . The two groups of 
political elites incur defense spending to fight over the distribution of land. The amount of land claimed 
by an emperor is assumed to be )/(2 tttt DDDL ′+= ,11 where tD  ( tD′ ) is the amount of tax revenue 
devoted to military spending in the home (foreign) region. The balanced-budget condition requires that 
])1[( ttttttt KsKsDR ′′+−=+ τ , where the right-hand side is the amount of tax revenue collected by the 
elites in the home region.  
Denote tr  as the fraction of capital allocated to consumption by the elites and td  as the fraction 
capital allocated to defense spending (i.e. ttt KrR =  and ttt KdD = ). Taking the paths of tτ  and tL  as 
given, the households choose the control paths of tc  and ts  to maximize (1) subject to (2). Then, taking 
the households’ best response and the foreign elites’ paths of tτ ′  and td ′  as given, the home elites choose 
the control paths of tr , tτ  and td  to maximize (4) subject to (2).12 The equilibrium under political 
fragmentation is denoted with a superscript f. 
                                                 
11 We follow Alesina and Spolaore (2005) to use this tractable functional form, which originates from the literature 
on conflict resolution; see, for example, Hirshleifer (1991). 
12 Technically, we are solving a simultaneous-move differential game between the two groups of elites, and we 
focus on strongly symmetric strategies, in which the groups of elites take the same action both on and off the 
equilibrium path. This assumption is only for the purpose of ensuring that the equilibrium is subgame perfect among 
the set of off-equilibrium (symmetric) trajectories. In other words, the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium should 
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Lemma 2: Under political fragmentation, the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium is stationary and  
(8) ρ=ftc , 
(9) 
)2/(2)2/1(
)2/(
δβδ
δβτ +++
+=
lm
lf
t , 
(10) 
)2/(2)2/1( δβδ
β
+++= lm
lr ft , 
(11) 
)2/(2)2/1(
2/
δβδ
βδ
+++= lmd
f
t , 
(12) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+++
++−=−−=
)2/(2)2/1(
)2/(1 δβδ
δβρτ
lm
lcAg ft
f
t
f
t
f
t . 
Proof: See Appendix A.□ 
  
From (9), we see that the higher the m , the lower the fτ  will be. Given the households’ capital 
allocation rule )( ttt ms ττ ′−= ,13 each group of political elites have an incentive to undercut its own 
capital tax rate to prevent capital outflow and attract capital inflow. Therefore, higher capital mobility 
generates stronger tax competition and drives down the equilibrium tax rate under fragmentation. From (9) 
and (11), we see that as δ  increases, the elites levy a higher tax rate and allocate more tax revenue to 
defense spending. Therefore, δ  can be viewed as an index measuring the degree of defense competition. 
Also, note that tt DD ′=  so that 1=′= tt LL  and hence defense spending is wasted resources.  
 
Growth Effects of Political Fragmentation vs. Political Unification 
The condition that determines whether economic growth is higher under fragmentation or unification is 
(13) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+−+≡>⇔> )2/(
)2/1(1
2
1
δβ
δ
β llhmmgg
uf . 
                                                                                                                                                             
be understood as strongly symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a discussion 
on strongly symmetric equilibrium. 
13 This rule will be derived in Appendix A.  
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In other words, fragmentation dominates unification in growth if and only if capital mobility is 
sufficiently high. The critical threshold m  is decreasing in h  and increasing in δ . As the heterogeneity 
costs increase (or the unification benefits decrease), the degree of capital mobility can be lower while 
fragmentation still delivers a higher growth rate than unification. As the degree of defense competition δ  
increases, the tax rate under fragmentation goes up. Therefore, a larger δ  requires a higher degree of 
capital mobility in order to maintain a higher growth rate than unification.  
 
Proposition 1: If and only if the degree of capital mobility is above (below) a threshold, fragmentation 
dominates (is dominated by) unification in growth. This threshold is decreasing in heterogeneity costs (or 
increasing in unification benefits) and increasing in the degree of defense competition. 
Proof: Compare (7) and (12). Also, see (13).□ 
  
The Elites’ Preferred Regime 
Suppose the political regime is chosen by the political elites. Then, which regime would they prefer? In 
particular, we want to derive the conditions under which the elites prefer the regime that is less favorable 
to growth. Because the simple growth model does not exhibit transition dynamics, the lifetime utility of 
the elites can be simplified to 
(14) 2
00 lnln)1(ln
ββ
δ gLClRlV ++−+= .  
Because 00 . KC ρ=  and 1=L  under both regimes, (14) further simplifies to ββ /ln 0. gRlV +=  after 
dropping the exogenous terms. The condition that determines whether the elites’ utility would be higher 
under fragmentation or under unification is given by  
(15) )]2/(2)2/1ln[( δβδβ +++>−⇔> lmlggVV ufuf .  
The term )]2/(2)2/1ln[( δβδβ +++ lml  reflects the elites’ utility loss from consuming a lower level 
of tax revenue due to competition in capital taxation and defense spending. Capital mobility constrains the 
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tax rate and results into a negative effect on the elites’ utility through a reduction in the initial level of tax 
revenue. Similarly, defense competition causes the elites to divert a fraction of tax revenue to defense 
spending and hence lowers their tax consumption. As a result of these negative level effects, the emperors 
may have a lower level of utility under fragmentation even when this political regime is more favorable to 
growth. Proposition 2 and Figure 2 summarize this finding.  
 
Proposition 2: There exists a range of parameters, in which uf gg >  but  uf VV < . This range of 
parameters is given by ),( hhh∈ , where  
(16) βδβδ
δβ l
lm
lh −+++
+≡
)2/(2)2/1(
)2/(
,  
(17) )]2/(2)2/1ln[( δβδβ ++++≡ lmlhh .  
Proof: Comparing (7) and (12) shows that hhgg uf >⇔> . Also, using (6), (10) and (14) shows that 
hhVV uf <⇔< .□  
 
 
 
Intuitively, when the heterogeneity costs are sufficiently high (or the unification benefits are sufficiently 
low) such that hh > , which can be negative, the equilibrium growth rate is higher under fragmentation 
than under unification. However, due to the competition in taxation and defense spending, the elites suffer 
from consuming a lower initial level of tax revenue under fragmentation. When the heterogeneity costs 
are not excessively high (or the unification benefits are not excessively low) such that hh < , this 
Figure 1: Results of Proposition 2 
h
 uf gg <
1h h  
   uf gg >  
   uf VV <       uf VV >  
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negative level effect dominates the positive growth effect under fragmentation, and the elites enjoy a 
higher level of utility under unification. In fact, for 0≤h  (i.e. when there are no heterogeneity costs and 
possibly some unification benefits), the elites always prefer unification (i.e. 0>h ) because either tax 
competition or defense competition under fragmentation is detrimental to their utility. Figure 2 plots the 
growth rate when the regime is chosen by the elites to maximize their utility.  
 
 
 
As for the households, they always prefer the political regime that is more favorable to growth. 
To see this result, their lifetime utility can be re-expressed as  
(18) 2
0 lnln
ρρ
δ gLCU ++= .  
Denote the households’ lifetime utility under fragmentation and unification by fU  and uU  respectively.  
 
Proposition 3: uf UU >  if and only if uf gg > . 
Proof: Recall that 00 . KC ρ=  and 1=L  under both regimes.□  
 
Because the households always prefer the growth-maximizing regime, there is a range of parameter 
values in which the households and the elites prefer different political regimes. Furthermore, this range of 
h
1h h  
uf VV < uf VV >
g 
)(1 βρ lhgu ++−=
)(1 ffg τρ +−=
Figure 2: Economic Growth 
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parameters defined as hhh −≡Δ  expands as l , β , δ  or m  increases. As the degree of Leviathan 
increases, the elites place a larger relative weight on their own consumption of tax revenue, so that they 
care more about the level of tax revenue than growth. Similarly, as the elites become more impatient, they 
once again value less the benefit of higher growth. As the degree of defense or tax competition increases, 
the initial level of the elites’ tax consumption decreases; therefore, they would prefer unification unless 
the heterogeneity costs are excessively high. Corollary 1 summarizes this finding. 
 
Corollary 1: There exists a range of ),( hhh∈ , in which uf UU >  but uf VV < , and this range of 
parameter values expands as l , β , δ  or m  increases. 
Proof: Combine Propositions 2 and 3. Also, note that )]2/(2)2/1ln[( δβδβ +++=−≡Δ lmlhhh .□  
 
3. Conclusion 
This paper develops a simple endogenous-growth model to analyze the conditions under which economic 
growth is higher under political fragmentation than under political unification. In order to formalize the 
different growth effects of each political regime in a tractable theoretical framework, I have made a 
number of simplifying assumptions and used specific functional forms. The abstract model certainly does 
not capture all the important elements of the nation-state and united-empire systems but nonetheless 
serves its purpose in providing a simple framework that highlights the different growth effects of the 
heterogeneity costs or unification benefits under unification and the interstate competition in taxation and 
defense spending under fragmentation.  
The main results are as follows. Under political unification, the heterogeneity costs (unification 
benefits) have a negative (positive) effect on growth. Under political fragmentation, the interstate 
competition in defense spending has a negative effect on the economy while capital mobility that reduces 
the tax rate chosen by the elites has a positive effect. Although the abstract model may have neglected 
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other important characteristics of each political regime,14 whether fragmentation or unification is more 
favorable to growth should be partly determined by the relative magnitude of the above three factors. 
Furthermore, when the political regime is chosen by the elites, they do not necessarily choose the growth-
maximizing regime.  
This finding potentially explains why so many ancient civilizations, except for Europe, adopted 
the united-empire system while the nation-state system might have been more favorable to growth. 
Perhaps the heterogeneity costs in Europe due to its cultural and language diversity were higher than, for 
example, in ancient China such that the European rulers prefer political fragmentation while the Chinese 
rulers prefer political unification despite the possibility that political fragmentation would have been more 
favorable to growth and preferred by the citizens. 
Finally, let me conclude this paper with a brief discussion on the first unification of China in 221 
BC. Upon conquering the other nations and ending the Era of Warring States (from the 5th century BC to 
221 BC), Qin Shi Huang (sometimes referred to as the first emperor of a unified China) standardized the 
Chinese units of measurements, the currency, the length of the axles of carts, the legal system, and most 
importantly, the Chinese script. These policies reduced heterogeneity across regions and were meant to 
improve the political elites’ ability in ruling the unified China. An implication from the current study is 
that this reduction in heterogeneity costs led to a tendency of political unification in subsequent Chinese 
Dynasties. This tendency of political unification resulted into less political competition that could have 
stimulated China’s economic growth. 
 
                                                 
14 For example, Jones (1981) argues that through policy diversification and political variety, the nation-state system 
provided Europe with an insurance mechanism against economic stagnation caused by suboptimal policies.  
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Appendix A 
Control Paths for the Households: We firstly derive the control paths for the households that will be 
applicable to both Lemmas 1 and 2. Taking the paths of tτ  and tL  as given, the households choose the 
control paths for tc  and ts  to maximize (1) subject to (2). The current-value Hamiltonian is 
(A1) t
t
tttttttttt Km
ssscAKcH ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −′−−−−+=
2
)1()ln(
2
ττμ .  
The first-order conditions are 
(A2) 01 =−=∂
∂
tt
tt
t K
cc
H μ ,  
(A3) 0=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −′−=∂
∂
t
t
ttt
t
t K
m
s
s
H ττμ ,  
(A4) tt
t
ttttttt
tt
t
m
ssscA
KK
H μρμττμ &−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −′−−−−+=∂
∂
2
)1(1
2
,  
(A5) tt
t
tttttt
t
t KK
m
ssscAH &=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −′−−−−=∂
∂
2
)1(
2
ττμ ,  
and the transversality condition is 0lim . =−→∞ tt
t
t
Ke μρ . Combining (A4) and (A5) yields 
(A6) 1. −=+ tttttt KKK μρμμ && .  
Integrating (A6) with respect to time yields ρμ ρ /1. +Ω= ttt eK , and the transversality condition implies 
that the integration constant Ω  must equal zero. Therefore, we have   
(A7) ρμ /1=tt K .  
From (A7), 100 )( .
−= Kρμ  is independent of the elites’ actions and has a predetermined value. In other 
words, the initial value of the households’ co-state variable (which may become a state variable in the 
elites’ control problem) is predetermined. As a result, the households’ best response does not create any 
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incentive for the elites to deviate along the equilibrium path (i.e. the Stackelberg equilibrium is time 
consistent); see Xie (1997) and Karp and Lee (2003).  
Combining (A2) and (A7) yields (5) and (8). Solving (A3) yields 
(A8) )( ttt ms ττ ′−= .  
Because the equilibrium paths are stationary and independent of the state variable, the equilibrium is 
subgame perfect (i.e. the households have no incentive to deviate at any time t and for any realization of 
the state variable); see Dockner et al (2000). Finally, the second-order conditions are satisfied because (a) 
the control sets are convex, (b) the instantaneous utility function in (1) is strictly concave in tK , and (c) 
the law of motion for tK  is linear in tK ; see Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987). 
 
Proof for Lemma 1: Combining (A2) and (A7) from Lemma 1 yields (5). Taking the households’ control 
paths (5) and (A8) as given, the elites choose their control paths to maximize (4). Solving the symmetric 
equilibrium that maximizes the joint welfare of the two groups of elites is equivalent to solving the 
equilibrium in each region. Under unification, hAt −= 1 , 1=tL  and 0=ts  because tt ττ ′= . Because 
the households’ co-state variable has a predetermined initial value, we can directly substitute (5) into (A5) 
(instead of treating tμ  as a state variable) to obtain the elites’ current-value Hamiltonian given by 
(A9)    ttttttt KhKlKlH )1(~)ln()1()ln(
~
. τρμρτ −−−+−+= .  
The first-order conditions are 
(A10) 0~
~
=−=∂
∂ KlH t
tt
t μττ ,  
(A11) tttt
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KK
H μρμτρμ &~~)1(~1
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∂
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(A12) ttt
t
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∂ )1(~
~
τρμ ,  
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and the transversality condition is 0~lim . =−→∞ tt
t
t
Ke μβ . Combining (A11) and (A12) yields  
(A13) 1~~~ −=+ βμμμ tttttt KKK && . 
As before, integrating (A13) with respect to time and then using the transversality condition to set the 
integration constant to zero yield 
(A14) βμ /1~ =tt K .  
Substituting (A14) into (A10) yields 
(A15) βτ lt = . 
Because the elites’ control path is stationary and independent of the state variable, it is sub-game perfect. 
Also, the second-order conditions are satisfied as before. Finally, substituting (A15) into (A12) yields 
(A16) )(1 βρ lhgt ++−= .□ 
 
Proof for Lemma 2: Combining (A2) and (A7) yields (8). Taking the households’ control paths, tτ ′  and 
td ′  as given, the elites choose tr , tτ  and td  to maximize (4). Under political fragmentation, 1=tA , 
)/(2 tttt DDDL ′+=  and ])1[( ttttttttt KsKsKdKr ′′+−=+ τ . The current-value Hamiltonian is   
(A17) 
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where )( ttt ms ττ ′−=  from (A8). Imposing symmetry (i.e. tt ττ ′= ) on the first-order conditions yields  
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(A23)    0~
~
=−−=∂
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and the transverality condition is 0~lim . =−→∞ tt
t
t
Ke μβ . Combining (A21), (A22) and (A23) yields  
(A24)    ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
′′+−+−=+ KdKd
KdKKK
ttt
tt
tttttt
.1~~~ δδβμμμ && . 
The symmetry condition ( tt ττ ′=  for all t) implies that tt KK ′=  for all t. Integrating (A24) with respect 
to time and then using the transversality condition to set the integration constant to zero yield 
(A25) βδμ /)2/1(~ +=tt K .  
Combining (A18), (A19), (A20) and (A25) yields (9), (10) and (11). Because the elites’ control paths are 
stationary and independent of the state variables, they are sub-game perfect. Also, the second-order 
conditions are satisfied as before. Finally, substituting (9) into (A22) yields (12).□ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
